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I.  Introduction 
The impact of regulation on the production decisions of electric utilities 
was first described by Averch and Johnson  (1962).  They argued that rate-of- 
return regulation gives utilities the incentive to overcapitalize, that is,  to 
employ a capital-labor ratio that is larger than one that minimizes costs for 
a given output level.'  Courville (1974),  Spann (1974),  Petersen (1975), and 
Cowing (1978),  for example,  find evidence of an overcapitalization  bias using 
variations of the Averch and Johnson  (A- J) model. 
The major challenge to the A-J model concerns the nature of the regulatory 
environment.  Implicit in the A-J model is a regulator that constantly 
monitors capital returns and adjusts electricity prices to keep capital 
returns equal to their "fair" levels.  Joskow  (1974)  argues that regulators 
are more concerned with nominal electricity prices than with the rate of 
return on capital.  As long as nominal electricity prices are not increasing, 
regulators will not actively enforce the rate-of-return constraint,  thereby 
eliminating the source of the A-J bias.  As evidence in favor of his view, 
Joskow finds a positive relationship between changes in the average cost of 
electricity production and the frequency of rate hearings initiated by 
utilities.  He also argues that the implementation of fuel-cost-adjustment 
clauses and environmental regulations in the 1970s reflects his more general 
view of regulators as political entities rather than as Averch and Johnson's 
strict rate-of-return  enforcers. 
The total impact of these and other constraints on electric utility 
production decisions was examined by Atkinson and Halvorsen  (1984).  They 
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developed a generalized cost model that includes the impact of additional 
regulatory constraints and found empirical evidence of these impacts in a 
cross-section sample of electric utilities.  However,  they did not include 
Joskow's view of the regulatory process in their model. 
The purpose of this paper is to test Joskow's view of the regulatory 
mechanism by estimating a modified version of the Atkinson and Halvorsen 
model.  The modifications are of two sorts.  The first allows for different 
regulatory impacts over time as argued'by  Joskow.  The second permits the use 
of panel data and the estimation of total factor productivity  (TFP)  and its 
returns-to-scale  and technical-change components.  Joskow argues that when the 
A-J bias occurs,  utilities have less incentive not only to employ an efficient 
team of production inputs,  but also to innovate or to maintain a high rate of 
technical change.  Nelson and Wohar  (1983)  attempted to examine the impact of 
regulation on utility technical change,  but they could not estimate a direct 
regulatory impact on technical change.  Our procedure yields such an estimate. 
Our data are a panel sample of the seven major electric utilities in Ohio 
over the period 1965 to 1982.3 The advantage of this sample is that the 
technologies employed by these utilities should be fairly similar;  these Ohio 
utilities are all privately owned,  coal-burning plants and are subject to the 
same regulator.  Thus, the estimation of a common cost structure for these 
utilities should yield a smaller potential for specification bias than is true 
of previous studies of electric utilities,  whose samples include utilities 
that employ varying technologies or face different regulators. 
Our results square with Joskow's view.  We find considerable circum- 
stantial evidence in Ohio consistent with Joskow's  more general regulatory 
mechanism.  Our estimation results show that these utilities produce elec- 
tricity less efficiently during the years when Joskow expects regulatory 
constraints to be more binding,  and that regulation significantly retards the 
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that regulators and economists place on efficient production using a given 
capital stock appears to be misplaced;  the retardation of the rate of 
technical change implemented by these utilities appears to be an important 
source of bias.  However,  contrary to Joskow's view,  we find that regulation 
retards the technical change implemented by these utilities to a lesser extent 
during the years when regulatory constraints are more tightly binding. 
The next section of this paper contrasts the Averch-Johnson and Joskow 
views of the regulatory mechanism.  After that, the rate hearing experience in 
Ohio over the 1965 to 1982 period is discussed and is found to correspond 
quite well with Joskow's view of the regulatory mechanism.  The fourth part 
presents the model and outlines the testing procedures; the fifth section 
describes the empirical results.  The final section provides summary and 
concluding remarks. 
11. Averch-Johnson and Joskow Views of the Regulatory Process 
It is useful to view the regulatory process in two parts: 1)  the 
mechanics of setting a utility's electricity price structure,  and 2)  the 
events that initiate a rate hearing or a review of a utility's 
electricity price structure.  There is little disagreement among economists 
about the first part.  What brings a utility to a rate hearing and what 
motivates a regulator are open questions in the empirical literature.  The 
predominant answers to these questions were influenced by Averch and Johnson. 
They investigated the optimal response of a cost-minimizing  utility in static 
equilibrium t0.a  "fair"  rate of return on capital regulatory constraint.  They 
showed that when the rate of return on  capital constraint is binding,  and when 
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the incentive to overcapitalize, that is, to employ a capital-labor  ratio that 
is larger than one that minimizes costs for the chosen output level.4 
Implicit in the A-J model are two assumptions about the behavior of the 
regulator.  One is that the motivating factor behind regulatory action is the 
rate of return on capital; in the A-J model,  the constraint on a utility's 
profit-maximization  actions is that the actual rate of return on capital 
earned by a utility is no greater than the "fair" rate.  The second i-s  that an 
active regulator continually monitors utility returns and pounds on  a 
utility with a "visible  hand" to maintain the equality of a utility's profits 
with its "fair" profits.  This follows from Averch and Johnson's assumption of 
static equilibrium.  When a utility's profit is less than its "fair" level of 
profits,  the regulator calls a rate hearing to raise the "fair" return and, 
hence, the utility's price of electricity.  When a utility's  profits are above 
the "fair" level,  the regulator calls a rate hearing to lower its "fair" 
return and the price of electricity. 
With minor amendments, this view of regulatory behavior predominates in 
the economics literature, especially in empirical studies of electric utility 
behavior,  with the exception of  Joskow (1974).=  Joskow agrees that rate- 
of-return regulation will give a utility the incentive to employ an 
inefficient mix of input factors,  but he argues that the A-J bias may not 
always occur in a dynamic world.  In  Joskow's  view,  regulators are political 
institutions whose objective is to minimize "conflict  and criticism,"  not to 
keep the rate of return on capital equal to the "fair" rate. 
One important source of conflict and criticism is an increase in the 
nominal price of electricity.  Consumers will agitate against increases in 
electricity prices because they typically view these increases as price- 
gouging.  If electricity prices are not increasing,  and especially if they are 
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falling,  consumers are indifferent to the profits earned by a utility.  Thus, 
Joskow argues that utilities that are able to adjust their production and 
investment decisions to raise their earned rates of return without raising 
electricity prices will not be thwarted by the regulator.  In this case, there 
may be little A-J bias.  On the other hand,  Joskow argues that regulators do 
not initiate any actions to raise the rate of return on a utility's capital 
when it is below the "fair" rate unless requested to do so by the utility. 
Before a rate increase is granted, the utility will earn a return on capital 
below the "fair" return.  In this case, an A-J bias may appear. 
Thus, in contrast to the active A-J regulator, the Joskow regulator is 
passive,  adjusting the rate of return on a utility's capital only when 
requested to do so by a utility or by a consumer advocate.  Earned profits may 
deviate from "fair" profits over time if input prices, electricity demand,  and 
other factors change,  but the regulator does not institute a price change to 
re-equate earned profits with "fair"  profits until the next rate hearing.  In 
the meantime,  a utility can alter its production and investment decisions in 
ways opposite to those predicted by the A-J model;  The "fair" rate of return 
in  Joskow's view is a means to an end  (uncontroversial  electricity prices), 
not an end in itself.  After reviewing the regulatory experience across the 
U.S. between the 1950s and early 1970s,  Joskow concludes that: 
Contrary to the popular view,  it does not appear that regulatory 
agencies have been concerned with regulating rates of return per se.  The 
primary concern of regulatory commissions has been to keep nominal 
prices from increasing.  Firms which can increase their earned rates 
of return without raising prices or by lowering prices  (depending  on 
changing cost and demand characteristics) have been permitted to earn 
virtually any rate of return that they can.  Formal regulatory action in 
the form of rate of return review is primarily triggered by  firms 
attempting to raise the level of their rates or to make major changes in 
the structure of their rates.  The rate of return is then used to 
establish a new set of ceiling prices which the firm must live with until 
another regulatory hearing is triggered.  General price reductions do 
not trigger regulatory review,  but are routinely approved without formal 
rate of return review. 
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no action regarding prices unless major increases or structural changes are 
initiated by  the firms under its jurisdiction.  In  short, it is the 
firms themselves which trigger a regulatory rate of return review.  There 
is no "allowed" rate of return that regulatory commissions are continuously 
monitoring and at some specified point enforcing.  (Joskow,  1974,  p. 298) 
Because they work in a political environment, public utility commissions 
face other sources of conflict and criticism,  which have resulted in two 
additional constraints on utility behavior.  First, in the mid-1970s,  when 
energy costs increased rapidly,  utilities requested rate hearings in greater 
numbers than in the past.  This increased caseload put a large burden on these 
regulatory agencies,  who were accustomed to only a few hearings in a year. 
The time lag between the request for a rate hearing and a change in 
electricity prices increased, and many utilities were forced to request 
another rate hearing immediately after their previous hearing.  In  order to 
shorten this lag and to appease utilities,  regulators instituted fuel-cost- 
adjustment clauses that permitted utilities to pass higher fuel costs to 
consumers without the need for a formal rate hearing.  Second, environmental 
advocates successfully agitated public utility commissions to establish limits 
on the amount of pollution emitted by fossil-fueled utilities.  These two 
constraints complicate the analysis of the impact of a rate-of-return 
constraint on utility behavior. 
111. Rate Hearings and Average Costs of Ohio Utilities: 1965 to 1982 
Some evidence consistent with Joskow's view of the regulatory mechanism is 
found in the history of rate hearings in Ohio between 1965 and 1982.  To put 
this evidence into perspective,  refer to the figure on page 26,  which shows 
the behavior of the average price per kilowatt-hour  of electricity charged, 
and the quantity of kilowatt-hours sold,  by the seven major Ohio electric 
utilities. 
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nominal  electricity price and  consumption behavior  can be  seen: 1965  to 1968, 
1969 to 1975,  and 1976  to 1982.6  Within each  period,  the directions of 
change  in price and  quantity were  the same  for each utility in the sample. 
During  the 1965  to 1968  period,  the average price of  electricity changed very 
little and  electricity sales rose considerably.  During  the 1969  to 1975 
period,  theaverage annual growth  rate of  electricity sales slowed,  while  that 
of  prices increased greatly.  Between 1976  and 1982,  electricity sales 
declined for the first time  in Ohio's  history, while prices  increased at their 
fastest average  annual percentage rate. 
The  figure also shows  the percentage of  the seven  utilities requesting 
rate hearings in each year.  In  -the first period, utilities rarely requested 
rate hearings, and  their average costs were  falling.  This behavior 
corresponds with Joskow's  first proposition:  "During periods of  falling 
average cost we  expect  to observe virtually no  regulatory rate of  return 
reviews"  (p.  299).  The  average price of  electricity also was  falling during 
this period, consistent with Joskow's  second proposition:  "During periods of 
falling average  costs we  expect  to obsewe constant or falling prices charged 
by  regulated firms"  (p.  299).  Given  that there were  few  rate hearings  in this 
period, it is plausible that utility returns on  capital were  greater than or 
equal  to what  the "fair" returns the Public Utilities Commission of  Ohio 
(PUCO)  would have defined'had  they been requested to do  so.'  According  to 
Joskow,  if actual returns were  lower  than the "fair" return,  then the 
utilities would  have  asked  for price increases.  Hence  Joskow's  third 
proposition:  "During  periods of  falling average  costs we  expect  to observe 
rising or constant  (profit maximizing)  rates of  return"  (p.  299). 
- 
During the 1969  to 1975  period,  average costs increased slightly, trig- 
gering a modest  increase in the frequency of  hearings, while during the 1976 
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increased in the late 1960s because of inflation stimulated by economic 
policies; they increased very quickly and unexpectedly in the mid-1970s 
because of inflation engendered by worldwide food shortages and by the Arab 
oil embargo.  For a given electricity price,  such increases in operating costs 
drove utility profits below their "fair" levels.  Utilities promptly responded 
to these cost increases by requesting electricity price increases that,  in 
most cases,  were granted by the PUCO.  The frequency of hearings increased 
sharply as utilities had trouble keeping up with the effects of the rapid rise 
in costs.  Viewing the 1969 to 1975 period as a transition from a period of 
falling average costs to one of rising average costs,  the modest increase in 
rate hearings during this period is consistent with Joskow's  fifth 
proposition: 
The transition from a period of falling average costs to one of rising 
average costs for a particular regulated industry will at first yield no 
observable increase in the number of rate of return reviews filed by the 
regulatory agency,  but as cost increases continue more and more rate of 
return reviews are triggered as firms seek price increases to keep their 
earned rates of return at least at the level that they expect  the commis- 
sion will allow in a formal regulatory hearing.  (p.  300) 
For estimation purposes, the 1965 to 1982 interval was divided into two 
periods: 1965 to 1973 and 1974 to 1982.  Testable hypotheses of the A-J and 
Joskow views deal with the absolute and relative production inefficiencies of 
the utilities in these two periods.  The near absence of regulatory hearings 
in  the first period would suggest, to both Joskow and A-J,  that earned rates 
of  return of these utilities were at least as great as "fair" rates of return. 
Averch and Johnson would argue that earned rates of return were lower than 
monopoly rates of return and,  hence,  that the A-J bias should exist in the 
first period.  On the other hand,  Joskow would argue that earned rates of 
return may have been close to monopoly rates.  If this were true, then because 
monopoly rates are consistent with efficient production, there may have been 
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seventh proposition,  production may have been very efficient in the first 
period because reducing costs would have contributed to higher earned rates of 
return that were not taken away by regulators: 
During periods of falling or constant nominal average cost firms have an 
incentive to produce efficiently since all profits may be kept as long as 
prices stay below the level established by the regulatory commission 
in the last formal rate of return review.  (p.  303) 
The high frequency of hearings in the 1974 to 1982 period suggests that 
earned rates of return for these utilities were lower than "fair" rates of 
return for most of the period.  Because these earned rates were even further 
away from monopolistic rates of return,  Joskow would argue that it is more 
likely that there are inefficiencies of the A-J type in the second period. 
His proposition eight says: "During periods of rising average cost A-J type 
biases may begin to become important"  (p.  304).  He does not exclude the 
possibility that firms may continue to try to be as efficient as they were in 
the first period in order to earn greater than "fair" rates of return. 
However,  he argues that: 
Unless the direction of the cost path can be changed,  however,  the con- 
tinuous interaction of firms and regulators in formal regulatory hearings, 
resulting from the necessity to raise output prices,  is exactly the situa- 
tion for which the A-J type model  (with  some modifications) would hold.  I 
would therefore expect that it is under this situation of continuously 
rising output prices,  triggering rate of return reviews that the A-J type 
models and the associated results are most useful.  (p.  304) 
Thus,  Joskow would ar.gue  that utilities would try to organize their pro- 
duction more efficiently in the first period than in the second period.  His 
concept of production efficiency includes the static notion of employing 
currently available production inputs in the least-cost way for any given 
level of output  (that  is,  employing the least-cost  combination of inputs along 
a given isoquant) and the dynamic notion of investing in more productive 
capital and management techniques over time  (to  push the family of isoquants 
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productive inefficiency because their model analyzes a static equilibrium. 
They would argue that the amounts of this static inefficiency are the same in 
both periods because they assume a regulator who maintains the earned rate of 
return on capital at its "fair" rate. 
The distinction between the static and dynamic notions of production 
efficiency is important.  When a public utility commission conducts a rate 
hearing, it pays attention only to the static notion of production efficiency. 
Indeed,  most models of regulatory impact deal only with the static notion. 
However, it is conceivable that regulation also affects the rate of technical 
change implemented by utilities; if regulation biases the amount of capital 
employed by a utility, it also may bias the type of capital employed.  Regula- 
tory impacts on overall inefficiency and on the rate of technical change are 
estimated below. 
IV. Empirical Model 
A. The Generalized or Shadow Cost Model 
The A-J and Joskow views are examined using a modified version of the  - 
Atkinson and Halvorsen  (1984)  generalized long-run cost function approach with 
capital  (K) , labor  (L) , and fuel  (F)  as inputs.  Atkinson and Halvorsen 
argued that the long-run neoclassical cost-function  approach is incorrect for 
a regulated firm because it assumes the firm is minimizing cost in a perfectly 
competitive  world constrained only to produce a given level of output.g 
When the firm is subject to a number of regulatory constraints, the marginal 
product of each input does not equal the market price of the input,  but the 
market price of the input plus the marginal changes in the additional con- 
straints weighted by their Lagrange multipliers.  Atkinson and Halvorsen use 
the term "shadow" prices to refer to these modified market input prices.  The 
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exact specification of these shadow prices depends on the exact form of the 
additional constraints.  Atkinson and Halvorsen approximated these shadow 
prices by simple proportional relationships with market prices; that is,  the 
shadow price of input i P:  = kipi,  where Pi  is its market price 
and ki  is a constant. 
The generalized or shadow cost function is simply the neoclassical cost 
function  with P:  substituted for Pi: 
where C
S  is the shadow total cost of electricity production; 
pf is the shadow price of input factor i,  i = K,  L,  F; 
Q  is output of electricity;  and 
T  is time. 
Instead of minimizing long-run  actual costs,  a utility is assumed to minimize 
long-run  shadow costs by equating the shadow marginal cost of each 
input with the amount of the input used.  If the additional constraints are 
not binding,  then the ki  equal one and minimizing shadow costs is equivalent 
to minimizing actual costs.  If the ki  do not equal one,  then the firm is 
not operating at the lowest point of its long-run average cost curve. 
An observable cost function  based on the shadow cost function can be 
derived as follows.  First, recall the accounting identity for actual cost: 
where Xi  is the quantity of input i used in production.  Similarly, the 
accounting identity for shadow cost is: 
The shadow cost share equations: 
PQ  .xi 
Mi  = -  for i = K,  L,  F  c 
can be rewritten as: 
C"M; 
(2  pixi  = - 
ki 
for i = K,  L,  F 
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and summed over all i to obtain: 
Taking logarithms of both sides of  (3a)  yields: 
That is,  the logarithm of actual cost equals the logarithm of shadow cost plus 
the logarithm of the sum of the shadow cost shares each weighted by the 
inverse of its respective ki. 
To express each shadow cost share as a function of its corresponding 
actual cost share,  first divide both sides of  (2)  by ca: 
and substitute  (3a)  into  (4) : 
for i = K,  L,  F. 
Atkinson and Halvorsen estimate a system comprising  (3b)  and two of the 
three equations in  (5)  but without a time trend because they use cross-section 
data.  We add the appropriate time variables to the shadow cost equation and 
add a shadow TFP (TFP')  equation to our system in order to improve the 
efficiency of the shadow cost equation coefficient estimates.  Actual TFP is 
measured as the change in the average cost of production that is not due to 
changes in input prices.  It reflects the overall productivity of all inputs 
rather than the productivity of a single input such as labor.  The neoclassi- 
cal approach to the measurement of TFP assumes an optimal distribution of 
production resources in a firm,  which may be an inappropriate assumption for 
- 
regulated electric utilities.  The generalized cost-function  approach yields a 
shadow estimate of TFP that is consistent with regulated behavior.  The most 
important variable for the purposes of examining Joskow's view on productivity 
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behavior is the pure technical change component of TFP.  Gollop and Roberts 
(1981),  among others,  argue that this component is a better measure of 
productivity than TFP. 
The TFP'  equation is derived as follows.  First, take the time 
derivative of  (la): 
According to Shephard's Lemma,  the elasticity of actual total cost with 
respect to the market price of input i is equal to the share of input i in 
total cost: 
A modified Shephard's  Lemma for.the  shadow cost function is: 
Dividing both sides of  (6)  by cS  and using  (8)  yields a  functional 
relationship between the percentage change in shadow cost and the percentage 
changes in the P:,  Q,  and T: 
where a dot over a variable indicates the rate of change,  v;  is the 
elasticity of shadow cost with respect to output (alncS/aln~),  and 
9 is the rate of change in shadow cost,  holding all other variables 
constant (BlncS/a~).  (1-v8) is a measure of shadow returns to 
scale, and -4  is the measure of shadow technical change of interest in 
this paper. 
Next,  following the traditional definition of actual TFP as a Divisia 
index of factor inputs, the rate of change in TFP'  (us)  can be defined as: 
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Totally differentiating the accounting identity  (lb)  with respect to time and 
using Shephard  '  s Lemma yields  : 
Equations  (10)  and  (11)  imply: 
and using  (9): 
Finally,  because CM~  = 1,  the above expression can be 
i 
rewritten in terms of one of the xi,  say x=: 
Equation (12a) cannot be used for estimation purposes because WS is not 
observed.  It can be used to obtain an equation explaining the actual rate of 
change in TFP as a function of w',  but (12b) is easier to estimate. 
The general specification of our estimation model includes the total cost 
equation  (3b) , the  and M;  share equations from  (5) ,  and the 
TFP equation (12b).  The estimation model is based upon the translog 
functional form.  The translog shadow cost function is: 
1  7gT(lnQ)T  + %T2, 
with P:  = kip, and the usual linear homogeneity restrictions: 
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i  J 
y..=y..  foralliandj. 
1  J  J 1 
Using Shephard's Lemma (a),  the shadow cost share equations are: 
Substituting (13),  (14),  and the definition of P; into  (3b)  yields an 
estimable cost equation.  Substituting  (14)  and the definition of P: 
into  (5)  yields estimable cost share equations.  Finally, an estimable TFP 
equation is obtained by substituting  (14)  and the following v;  and 
9  expressions into (12b): 
Two modifications are made to these equations.  First,  separate values for 
the ki  coefficients were estimated for the 1965 to 1973 and 1974 to 1982 
periods in  order to estimate a shift in regulatory impact.  The ki 
coefficient estimates for the 1974 to 1982 period are denoted with a subscript 
"  S" 
Second,  % and hs  were normalized to one because the shadow cost 
system is homogeneous of degree zero in the ki. This means that only 
relative price efficiency can be examined using the ki,  by testing ki= 
kj=l and kis=kjs=l  for i,  j = K,  F.  Differences in absolute price 
efficiency between the two periods,  relevant for a test of Averch-Johnson 
versus Joskow,  cannot be tested using differences between ki  and kis. 
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described below.  lo 
These translog equations form a nonlinear,  seemingly unrelated regression 
system.  It is similar to that of Gollop and Roberts (1981), only generalized 
to allow for the impact of all types of regulation on utility behavior.  The 
maximum likelihood LSQ option of TSP,  version 4.OE,  was used to estimate this 
translog system. 
B. Data 
Data for labor input and the price of labor are taken from Financial 
Statistics of Selected Electric Utilities,  1982,  Department of Energy 
(DOE/EIA-0437(82)),  February 1984.  The quantity of labor is the number of 
electric department employees,  with a part-time worker counted as one-half of 
a full-time worker.  The labor price is defined as the ratio of labor expense 
to the quantity of labor,  where labor expense is total salaries and wages 
charged to electric operation. 
The fuel price data come from Standard and Poor's  Compustat Services, 
Inc.,  Utility Compustat 11.  Fuel operation expense is the total cost of 
fuel used exclusively for the production of electricity.  The price of fuel is 
the average cost of fuel per million Btu,  which is the total cost of fuel used 
for electricity production divided by its total Btu content in millions.  The 
quantity of fuel input is millions of Btu, defined as the ratio of fuel 
operating expenses to the average cost per million Btu. 
The data for the capital price and capital stock come from various issues 
of  Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United 
States,  U.S. Federal Power Commission.  The capital price measure is the 
conventional market price of capital,  which is a function of the long-term 
debt interest rate, the required return on equity capital,  the preferred stock 
dividend rate, the depreciation rate,  and the Handy-Whitman index.  The 
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depreciation rate is based on a 30-year average service life.12  The 
product of capital price and capital stock is the total capital costs. 
Total cost is the sum of labor,  fuel,  and capital costs. 
V. Empirical Evidence 
A. Model Characteristics 
The results of estimating the model over the 1965 to 1982 period are shown 
in table 1.  Before testing the regulation bias hypotheses, it is useful to 
examine the sense of the estimated model.  A quick glance at the t-statistics 
- 
shows that the explanatory variables are just that -- only two of the 25 
estimated coefficients have t-statistics less than 2 in absolute value.  Apart 
from the ki,  the statistical significance of the coefficients does not 
necessarily provide strong evidence about the adequacy of the estimated model. 
Instead,  characteristics of the production technology implied by the 
coefficients provide better clues of model plausibility.  The estimated 
returns to scale are a good check of model adequacy for utilities because 
utilities ought to display increasing returns to scale given the large fixed 
costs required to supply electricity over an extensive geographic market. 
Table 2 reports the estimates of the elasticity of cost with respect to 
output averaged over all firms for each year.  The shadow estimate is the 
elasticity of shadow cost with respect to output from  (15).  The actual 
estimate is the shadow elasticity adjusted for the difference between actual 
and shadow costs: 
If returns to scale are increasing, then the cost elasticity is less than one. 
As shown in table 2,  the cost elasticities averaged over firms indicate 
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increasing returns to scale over the whole sample period.  Both the shadow and 
the actual elasticities behave similarly over time: the size of the increasing 
returns to scale grows moderately over the first period and shrinks over the 
second,  and returns to scale are greater on average in the second period. 
These results are consistent with the behavior of output over these periods. 
In  the first period, as output was increasing,  these utilities were operating 
on  lower portions of their average cost curves,  where returns to scale are 
lower.  In  the second period, as output grew more slowly and eventually fell, 
these utilities operated on  higher portions of their average cost curves, 
where returns to scale are higher.  These results are the opposite of those of 
Gollop and Roberts (1981),  who do not allow for a regulatory bias.  They find 
an increase in returns to scale in the first period and a drop in returns to 
scale in 1974-75,  the last years of their sample. 
As further evidence,  constant returns to scale and homogeneity of the cost 
function are tested.  Homogeneity means that scale economies are the same for 
firms of all sizes in all years,  and constant returns to scale means that 
there are no cost savings to increasing plant size.  Homogeneity requires that 
-y  =-y  =-y  =-y  =O; 
LQ  FQ  TQ  QQ 
constant returns requires homogeneity plus P =l.  Both homogeneity and 
Q 
constant returns to scale are rejected at better than the 0.5 percent 
significance level.  . 
The estimated actual and shadow cost shares for the inputs are shown in 
tables 3a and 3b,  respectively.  The actual cost shares show that capital was 
the largest component of actual cost in the first period,  and that labor 
became the largest cost component in the second period;  fuel was the smallest 
- 
cost component in both periods.  The shadow cost shares show that capital and 
labor were the largest and smallest cost components,  respectively,  in  both 
periods.  The difference between the actual and shadow cost shares is rather 
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dramatic,  and again reflects the ratio of shadow to actual cost from  (4)  and 
(5).  The large difference suggests that looking at the actual cost shares 
will give a misleading picture of the reaction of these utilities to changes 
in  regulated prices. 
Table 4  shows the decomposition of the growth rate of actual average cost 
into its components.  This decomposition is similar to that for the growth 
rate of shadow cost  (11): 
The first column of table 4  shows the average growth rate of actual average 
cost for each year.  The next three columns are the M;P~ terms for 
the three inputs;  the fifth column shows the contribution of the returns to 
scale term ($-1)~  using vt from  (16) ; the sixth shows the contribution 
of the technical change term v;: 
The last column is simply the difference between the first column and the sum 
of the next five.  This remainder is not zero,  because the five components on 
the right-hand side of  (17)  are estimated.  Note that this remainder is not 
derived from any of the estimated regression equations. 
Every cost component except scale economies on average added to the growth 
of  average costs in both periods.  Capital and fuel were the largest contrib- 
utors to average cost growth in both periods,  and capital and technical change 
accounted for much of the increase in the growth rate of average costs between 
the two periods.  The remainder is about one-sixth the size of the average 
growth rate of average costs in the first period,  but it is very small in the 
second.  This suggests that the shadow cost model fits the second period much 
better than the first. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copy-  20 - 
Estimated values for actual and shadow TFP and its components are shown in 
tables 5a and 5b.  The shadow TFP measure is the partial derivative of shadow 
average cost with respect to time,  which is the sum of two terms, the first 
reflecting scale economies and the second representing technical change: 
(19)  TFP~  =  (1-V;)Q  -  v;. 
Actual TFP (TFP~)  comes from  (19)  but with v;  from  (16)  replacing v6, and 
9  from  (18)  replacing v;.  The results in table 5a show that scale economies have 
boosted TFP~  growth in every year except 1980,  though the gain was signif- 
icantly less in the second period.  However, technical change was negative in 
every year but 1965,  pulling the growth of TFP~  down,  especially in the 
second period.  The results for TFP',  shown in table 5b,  are qualitatively 
similar to those of TFP
a and its components, though it is interesting that 
9  was slightly positive on average in the first period. 
The most notable characteristic about both technical change estimates is 
their strong downward trend.13  This rather uniform decline is due to 
the strong estimated time trend yTT.  That shadow input prices have 
little influence on technical change is not surprising,  because electricity 
production offers little input substitutability in the short and medium runs. 
B. Regulatory Impact 
The estimation results in table 1 show that all of the log(ki)  are 
individually significantly different from zero at better than the 0.5% signif- 
icance level.  The joint test of the statistical insignificance of all four of 
the log(ki)  is rejected at better than the 0.5 percent significance level. 
Thus,  relative price efficiency is rejected over the whole sample,  and the 
neoclassical cost function approach for regulated firms employed by Gollop and 
Roberts  (1981)  and others is inappropriate for this sample.  l4 
A test of the A-J view and a test of the implications of Joskow's  view is 
whether production inefficiencies due to regulation differ in the 1965 to 1973 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copy-  21 - 
and the 1974 to 1982 periods.  The A-J view is that the inefficiencies should 
be the same in each period, while the Joskow view is that there should be 
greater inefficiencies in the second period than in the first.  The true cost 
of regulation,  and hence the magnitude of the inefficiencies created by 
regulation, cannot be estimated,  because there is no evidence to suggest how 
the utilities would have organized their production  had regulation not existed 
over the sample period.  For example, the activities of production and 
distribution  might have been separated,  different amounts of capital might 
have been employed,  and different technologies might have been chosen.  l5 
Hence,  it is impossible to know what these firms' cost functions and 
associated returns to scale and productivities would have been. 
However,  "instantaneous" tatal and dynamic inefficiency estimates can be 
computed.  The total measure compares actual utility costs predicted by the 
estimated model with the actual costs predicted by the model,  but with % 
and & set equal to one in both periods.  That is,  current production costs 
for actual levels of output,  which are generated by current production 
techniques and regulatory constraints, are compared with the costs generated 
with the same production techniques and for the same actual output levels,  but 
without the regulatory constraints.  This estimate,  also examined by Atkinson 
and Halvorsen, measures movement along the isoquant to the efficient input 
mix. 
An estimate of the dynamic notion of inefficiency can be obtained by 
examining the technical change experienced by these utilities with and without 
regulation.  As above, technical change with regulation is that implied by the 
estimated model; technical change without regulation is that implied by the 
estimated model,  but with all ki  set equal to one.  The difference does not 
have a real-world  counterpart or explanation,  but it does indicate the 
direction of regulatory bias. 
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Note that our measure of the regulatory impact on technical change is 
different from that of Nelson and Wohar  (1983).  In their model, TFP  is the 
sum of the technical-change term, the returns-to-scale  term,  and a separate 
regulatory impact.  Without regulation,  TFP  is the sum of only the returns-to- 
scale and technical-change terms.  This naturally begs the question of how 
regulation affects TFP  if it does not affect the components of TFP. 
Obviously,  Nelson and Wohar cannot test for a regulatory impact on technical 
change.  Their measures of a regulatory impact on technical change are purely 
hypothetical,  based on the difference between different TFP  values calculated 
using assumed,  not estimated,  values for the regulatory impact coefficient, 
and their returns-to-scale and regulatory impact terms.  The reader is left to 
wonder why the authors believed that regulation does not affect the 
returns-to-scale term. 
Two sets of measures can be examined for a regulatory impact: actual and 
shadow.  As shown in Israilevich and Kowalewski (1987), the actual cost and 
the actual and shadow returns-to-scale  and technical-change equations are 
homogeneous of degree zero in the ki,  while the shadow cost equation is not.  - 
Thus,  either the actual or the shadow returns-to-scale  and technical-change 
measures can be used to examine the regulatory bias.  The regulatory bias to 
the translog shadow measures is a constant for each variable in each period. 
This can be seen by subtracting the translog shadow equation for any of these 
variables from the same equation,  but with the ki  set equal to one.  The 
reason is that the cost-minimization  model is set in a static equilibrium 
framework.  The regulatory biases to the actual variables are not constant 
because they differ from the shadow measures by a proportional function of the 
ratio of shadow to actual cost.  This ratio,  and hence the degree of 
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examine the regulatory bias for this reason and because the shadow measures 
have no real-world meaning. 
Our inefficiency estimates reject Averch and Johnson's view and do not 
reject Joskow's view.  As shown in table 6,  the total inefficiency measure 
differs between the two periods,  contrary to Averch and Johnson's view. 
Moreover,  the direction of change between the two periods is what Joskow would 
expect -- total inefficiency is about 16 percentage points greater in the 
second period.  In the first period,  total inefficiency steadily increases 
from about 61.5 percent to 73.8 percent and averages about 66.6 percent.  In 
the second period,  it steadily increases from 74.9 percent to 87.4  percent and 
averages about 82.6 percent. 
These total inefficiency estimates give the appearance of being overly 
large in magnitude.  Atkinson and Halvorsen find much smaller inefficiency 
losses  (9.0  percent) in their cross-section  sample of 1970 firms,  which 
includes two of our firms.16  However,  the Atkinson and Halvorsen result 
captures only the static portion of total inefficiency costs because they do 
not use time variables in their cost equation.  Our estimates include the 
dynamic inefficiency costs,  and hence are more representative of the total 
costs of regulation. 
The difference between the Atkinson and Halvorsen result and ours suggests 
that the dynamic inefficiency may be quite large.  Indeed,  as shown in table 
7,  we find that regulation may have retarded the growth of technical change on 
average by about 0.64  percentage point per year in the first period and 
by 0.44  percentage point per year in the second.  This an important 
- 
result,  and one that has been neglected by economists and regulators alike. 
Regulation not only affects the efficient utilization of existing production 
inputs,  but it also affects the implementation of efficient capital and 
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management techniques over time.  Unlike our total inefficiency estimates, the 
dynamic portion of our total inefficiency estimate rejects Joskow's view of 
greater regulatory bias in the second period. 
This regulatory bias on technical change is opposite to the casual 
impression given by the trends in actual and shadow technical change shown in 
tables 5a and 5b.  The strong downward trends in both technical change 
measures,  especially given the total inefficiency cost estimates shown in 
table 6,  might lead some analysts to infer that tighter regulatory constraints 
contributed to the slowdown in technical change in the second period. 
However,  table 7  shows that the regulatory bias on technical change was less 
in the second period. 
Finally,  an interesting result in table 7  is that regulation biased 
returns to scale upward on average in  both periods.  Contrary to Joskow's 
view, the regulatory bias on  returns to scale is smaller in the second period. 
Netting out the two components, TFP was biased down by 0.46 percentage point 
per year in the first period and by about 0.33 percentage point per year in 
the second.  This result also rejects Joskow's view of greater dynamic 
inefficiency in the second period. 
VI. Swnmary and Conclusions 
Electric utility regulators attempt to maintain a competitive price for 
electricity by adjusting the rate of return on a utility's capital.  At first 
blush,  this price-setting scheme appears sensible.  It seems reasonably 
efficient to allow utilities to pass along operating costs and to cover their 
cost of capital.  However,  there are potentially serious problems with this 
type of regulation  related to consumer reactions to price increases and to the 
types of incentives given to utilities.  First, price increases may lower the 
consumption of electricity,  which may reduce earned rates of return below 
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"fair" rates and trigger a price increase,  which in turn may lower consumption 
and trigger another price increase, and so on.  That is, the proper response 
to falling utility profits because of lower demand may not be to raise prices. 
Second,  utilities may be able to effect price increases by using "too 
much" capital, that is,  by overcapitalizing,  which inflates their rate base. 
Indeed,  rate increases lower the risk of capital investment below the risk 
level of unregulated industries, clearly giving utilities the incentive to 
overcapitalize.  This potential bias was recognized by Averch and Johnson,  and 
many empirical studies that adopted their model found an overcapitalization 
bias. 
Finally, the ability to pass along operating cost increases that origi- 
nated from productivity declines suggests that utilities may not have the 
incentive to raise productivity.  This dynamic source of inefficiency was 
recognized by Joskow,  who also argued that the regulatory mechanism is more 
complicated than that assumed by Averch and Johnson. 
This paper is the first,  to our knowledge,  to explicitly test the Averch- 
Johnson view against Joskow's more general view.  Using a modified version of 
the generalized long-run  cost function derived by Atkinson and Halvorsen 
and a sample of the seven major electric utilities in Ohio over the 1965 to 
1982 period,  substantial evidence is found against the A-J view.  Our total 
inefficiency measure shows that regulatory constraints were more binding 
during the years in which Joskow expects.them  to be more binding.  We also 
find that regulation substantially retards the rate of technical change 
experienced by these utilities.  However, the retardation in technical change 
is greater during the years when Joskow expects regulation to be less binding. 
This is the first demonstration of a regulatory impact on technical change. 
- 
It clearly suggests that regulators ought to pay closer attention to the 
incentives they give utilities to innovate.  l7 
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COEFFICIENTS COMPUTED FROM PARAMETER RESTRICTIONS 
Coefficient  Estimate  Std. Error  T-Statistic 
-----------  ----------  ----------  ----------- 
SK  1.4586  8.03743-02  18.1472 
%K  6.46143-02  1.69563-02  3.8108 
~FE  1.06233-01  1.40533-02  7.5588 
r~~  -3.42733-02  5.43513-03  -  6.3058 
~KQ  -8.61253-02  9.56773-03  -  9.0017 
YKT  1.14703-03  1.05543-03  1.0869 
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ESTIMATED  ELASTICITY OF  COST  WITH  RESPECT  TO  OUTPUT 
(averaged over  firms) 
Year  Actual  Shadow 
NOTE:  The  elasticity of  shadow  cost with respect to output is computed  using 
% from  equation (15).  The  elasticity of  actual cost is 
computed  from  equation  (16). 
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ESTIMATED ACTUAL COST SHARES 













































NOTE: The actual cost shares are computed using equation  (7). 
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ESTIMATED SHADOW COST SHARES 
(averaged over firms) 
Year 
---- 










































NOTE: The  shadow cost shares are computed using equation (14). 
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ESTIMATED COMPONENTS OF THE RATE OF CHANGE 
IN ACTUAL AVERAGE COST 
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-  2.888% 
-  2.012 
-2.963 
-  2.418 
-1.353 
























NOTE:  These figures are computed using equation  (17).  The sum of the 
capital,  labor,  fuel, scale economies, and technical change columns is 
the estimated percentage change in actual average cost.  The difference 
between the average cost column and this estimated percentage change is 
the remainder. 
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ESTIMATED  ACTUAL  TOTAL  FACTOR  PRODUCTIVITY 
AND  COMPONENTS 







































NOTE:  Actual total factor productivity and its two  components  are computed 
from equation (19) but with $ from  (16)  replacing vc  and 
v;  from  (18)  replacing v;. 
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NOTE:  Shadow total factor productivity and its components are computed using 
equation  (19). 
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REGULATORY  IMPACT  ON  ACTUAL 






























NOTE:  The  columns  show  the difference between  the estimated actual measures 
and the estimated actual measures with the ki  all set equal to.one. 
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lThis interpretation of the Averch-Johnson result is due to Baumol and 
Klevorick  (1970). 
2That  is, Courville (1974),  Spann (1974),  Petersen (1975),  Cowing (1978), 
and Nelson and Wohar (1983), for example, test only for an overcapitalization 
bias against an alternative hypothesis of no bias.  Of these papers, only 
Nelson and Wohar do not find an overcapitalization  bias. 
3~he  seven major electric utilities in Ohio are Ohio Power;  Cincinnati Gas 
and Electric; Cleveland Electric Illuminating;  Columbus and Southern Ohio 
Electric;  Dayton Power and Light;  Ohio Edison;  and Toledo Edison.  Over the 
1965 to 1982 period,  they accounted for about 90 percent of electric power 
sales in Ohio. 
4~ctually,  Baumol and Klevorick  (1970)  argue that Averch and Johnson did 
not prove this as a general-result.  Note that if there are additional 
production factors, then the amount of capital relative to these other inputs 
also will be higher than for the cost-minimizing firm. 
5~ slight modification to the Averch-Johnson  regulatory process was the 
introduction of a "regulatory lag";  see,  for example,  Bailey and Coleman 
(1971)  and Baumol and Klevorick  (1970). 
6~he  average price shown in the figure is not the regulated price, but the 
ratio of average total revenue for the seven utilities to their average total 
sales.  In general, different consumers face different regulated price sched- 
ules,  and utilities serving different geographic markets may be allowed to 
charge different prices for the same category of consumer. 
7~t  can never be known whether earned returns were greater than "fair
1' 
returns because there were no rate hearings for all firms during these years. 
80ther production inputs,  such as materials,  managerial skills,  and 
available infrastructure,  for example,  are excluded because there are no 
reliable data for these factors. 
g~evertheless,  some authors,  for example Gollop and Roberts  (1981,1983)  , 
use the neoclassical approach to study electric utilities. 
strict test of Averch and Johnson's view using the ki  is % not 
equal to 1 and hS  not equal to one,  because Averch and Johnson consider 
only a rate-of-return  regulatory constraint.  If these hypotheses cannot be 
rejected, then Nelson and Wohar  (1983)  and other papers that test only this 
constraint are potentially incorrect. 
llsee  Cowing, Small,  and Stevenson  (1981)  for the equations used to 
compute the capital stock and capital price variables. 
12capital  Stock Estimates for Input  -Output  Industries  : Methods and 
Data,  Bulletin 2034,  U.S. Department of Labor,  Bureau of Labor 
Statistics,  1979. 
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FOOTNOTES 
13~  strong downward trend in the rates of technical change experienced 
by utilities also was found by Nelson and Wohar (1983),  Gollop and Roberts 
(1981),  and Gollop and Jorgenson (1980), all of whom used samples that ended 
in the 1970s.  Thus,  the results reported here confirm these earlier findings 
for the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
14The  strict test of Averch and Johnson's view is rejected; % and 
kFs  are jointly statistically different from zero at better than a 0.5 
percent significance level. 
''under  the current regulatory environment,  the production and 
distribution of electricity must be handled by each utility.  Moreover,  the 
transferal of electric power across state lines also is impeded. 
161t  is likely that our estimates are more accurate for Ohio because 
our sample includes only Ohio firms,  which are fairly similar in a number of 
important respects,  as mentioned earlier. 
 he  poor technical-change performance also may be due to increased 
investment in nuclear power plants over this period,  which drew funds away 
from conventional power-generation capital investments. 
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